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REGULATORY AND NONREGULATORY STRATEGIES 
FOR CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS 
Alain Enthoven and Roger Noll 
Health care is one of the most rapidly growing parts of 
the American economy. Real age-adjusted per capita spending on 
health care rose SS percent from 196S to 197S.1 The largest single 
part of this increase is accounted for by hospitals. Between 196S 
and 197S, real age-adjusted per capita spending on hospitals increased 
80 percent. By 1976, spending on hospital care reached $5S.4 billion 
or 40 percent of total health spending.
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Consequently, the principal 
focus of public discussion of health care costs has been on hospital 
services. Recently, the debate has centered on the use of new medical 
technologies by hospitals and excessive use of hospitaliza�ion, 
especially for surgery and diagnostic testing. 
The rise in hospital spending h as several possible explana-
tions. One might be that consumers can now buy better health than they 
could in the past. Higher incomes enable consumers to purchase more 
medical care, just as higher incomes lead to increased consumption of 
other goods and services.
3 Technical developments that make health care 
services more effective in treating illness also increase .the demand 
for medical services. If these factors were the primary force driving 
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up medical expenditures, a rise in medical expenditures should be 
associated with improved health. One cause for concern is that the 
large spending increases of the past decade do not appear to have 
produced a corresponding improvement in the overall health status 
of the population, at least as measured by aggregate indicators of 
morbidity and mortality. Bunker,
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Lembke,5 �ennberg,6 and others 
have no�ed wide variations in the per capita consumption of certain 
health care services among similar populations without any apparent 
difference in medical need or health status. Gaus found a large and 
significant difference in hospital and surgical utilization rates 
between Medicaid beneficiaries who are served by group practice 
Health Maintenance Organizations (H.V,Os) and control groups served 
by fee-for-service physicians, with no significant difference between 
the study groups and their controls in terms of perceived health 
status, number of chronic conditions, or disability days per month.7 
Another cause of rising expenditures could be that medical 
care improves the q uality of life in ways not measured by aggregate 
statistics on health status. While this may be important, it is n.:>t 
readily measurable, and, in any event, the rising public concern about 
increa�es in medical expenditures suggests that at least some of these 
gains in the quality of life are probably not worth the costs. 
A third, probably most important cause of rising medical 
care expenditures appears to lie in the incentives that have been 
created by changes in the way services are paid for. The share of 
hospital costs paid directly by consumers declined fron: 49.6 percent 
in 1950 to 8.9 percent in 1976.8 In 1965, government paid 24.5 percent 
9 of total health care costs; by 1976, the share was up to 42.2 percent. 
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The main purpose of the government programs was to increase the amount 
of services consumed by target groups such as the elderly and the poor. 
The source of increased care for target groups was intented to be a 
net increase in real resources devoted to health care, rather than 
reduced care for the remainder of the population. So it is not 
surprising that healtl: care spending has increased faster than total 
income; indeed, had the results been otherwise, such programs as 
Medicare and Medicaid could only be deemed as failures. But 
government has succeeded in increasing substantially the amount 
of medical services provided to these target groups. In 1976, 
Medicaid, for example, made per capita expenditures on medical care 
for the 23.2 million Medicaid recipients that nearly equalled average 
per capita spending by the rest of the population.10 
The insulation of the patient from the direct financial 
consequences of hospital treatment eliminates most of the incentive 
that a doctor or patient might have to make sure that treatments are 
worth their cost. To the e xtent that providers and patients respond 
to financial incentives, treatments of low or u.�certain value will be 
applied more frequently if neither the patient nor the doctor is 
financially responsible for the costs. 
In theory, government or private insurers could try to prevent 
spending on medical care of low value by carefully monitoring the 
diagnosis and treatment of each patient and reimbursing only expenditures 
for tre&tments of significant medical value. Such close monitoring 
would require substantial administrative expenditures and much 
second guessing of professional decisions. Even if the costs of such 
an endeavor were worthwhile, private carriers would have little to 
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gain fror.l under taking therrL In most cas, s, ins ur.:in .... -:t: p re miu:ns are 
experience rated, so, in L�ffeL'.t, tl-u2 .. :ost of additional claims 
paid are passed on to the group paying the premiums. Moreover, 
government and employers tend to evaluate the ef f iciancy of claims 
processors by the percentage of premium revenue that is absorbed by 
administrative cost, not by success in overall cost control, and 
monitoring treatment increases administrative cost. In any case, if 
one company were to attempt such a procedure, medical professionals 
might refuse to cooperate, or indeed even decline to accept patients 
with policies from that company. Without the cooperation of 
physiciaas, assessing the necessity of medical treatments is an 
impossible task. 
The positioa of the government in trying to monitor the 
care of patients is in some respects stronger and in other respects 
weaker than the position of insurance companies. Since patients 
aided by government are generally poor, providers have little chance 
of extracting payment from the patient should the government refuse 
to allow a particular cost. Moreover, government is a much larger 
purchaser of medical care than any private insurer, and its decisions, 
there�ore, can have a greater impact on the economic viability of 
a provider. Nevertheless, government, too, must depend on voluntary 
cooperation among providers in order to obtain service, and cannot 
tolerate massive refusals to serve patients whose bills it has 
promised to pay. Moreover, government is bound by procurement rules, 
designed to prevent favoritism and fraud that constrain the use of 
individual judgment. These rules are influenced by political pressure 
from well-focused provider interests. 
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Because of the difficulties of effectively monitoring treatment, 
both government and private insurers rely on physicians to determine 
treatments and to establish peer review as the mechanism to curb 
spending on treatments of no value. Because all doctors and patients 
face essentially the same pattern of weakened incentives to consider 
the costs of alternative treatments, standard medical practice can 
be expected to include an ever growing array of accepted procedures 
that have a low or uncertain marginal value. Thus, reimbursement 
of the costs of standard treatment will lead to ever increasing 
expenditures on medical services yielding little benefit. 
To date, three generic types of policy responses to the 
problem of rising health expenditures have been proposed. One is to 
increase greatly the share of medical costs that is paid by the 
patient so that consumers will have much more incentive to ecoaomize 
on medical services.12 A second is to leave intact the incentives for 
increasing expenditures in the fee-for-service, cost reimbursement, 
third-party intermediary system, but to impose economic and technical 
regulation on providers in an attempt to prevent the incentives from 
producing their natural effect. The third is to restructure the 
dE,livery and payments system in a manner that alters the basic 
financial incentives facing providers so that they find it in their 
interest to provide good quality but cost-effective care. The main 
thesis of this paper is that spending on health services cannot be 
effectively controlled in the present political context without the 
use of a policy of the third type. 
RELIA.�CE ON CONSffi.lER COST-SHARING 
The first alternative, placing the whole burden of economizing 
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on patients by gre:atly increasing the extent of consumt;r cost-sh<Jring, 
is not practical because it is incompatible with the objectives of 
both private insurance and public policy towards m'"dical care. A 
large increase in decuctibles and coi.nsurance rates would increase the 
risk that a family would suffer serious financial loss in the event 
of major illness. When applied to government programs that are aimed 
at lower income groups, it would also reduce the access of the target 
population to medical care. Of course, the purpose of insurance is 
to prevent serious f1nancial loss, and the purpose of the governmen. 
programs, besides providing additional protection against serious 
financial loss, is to guarantee all citizens access to needed care, 
regardless of ability to pay. 
To adopt a system in which patients must pay directly a 
much greater share of medical care expenditures is to conclude that 
so�iety has picked an overly generous point along an immutable trade-. 
off between an equitable and an efficient health care delivery systc.m. 
The evidence suggests that Americans are not yet ready to accept thi.s 
conclusion. A good indicator of the political acceptability of this 
approach to cost control is the fact that recent proposals by the Nix0n 
and I-ord Administrations to increase cost sharing by Medicare benefici­
aries failed to attract a single Congressional sponsor. In the current 
political climate, any policy emphasizing more coinsurance inevitably 
will include an upper limit on a family's health care spending above 
which all or practically all will be paid by insurance. At that 
point, the incentives in the fee-for-service, cost-reimbursement, third­
party intermediary system would continue to work as before. The effect 
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would be to pull medical care resources out of primary care and into 
catastrophic care to an even greater extent than is the case today. This 
means even less emphasis on activities that can help prevent disease 
and add significantly to the quality of life, and more emphasis on 
care that offers small net marginal benefits at very great cost. Thus, 
a shift to a system of catastrophic insurance would not merely be a 
financial device for reassigning risks; it would also mean a further 
reallocation of health care resources towards categories of care (such 
as long-term hospitalization) that probably are already accounting 
for too high a share of health care expenditures. 
REGULATIONS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR APPROPRIATE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
A great deal of regulation is inevitable in health care. The 
debate over regulation is not a matter of all or none. The key 
issue regarding medical care costs is this: is the purpose of regu­
lation to stop or reverse the forces determined by the basic financial 
incentives in the system, or is it to channel those forces into 
socially desirable forms of competition? Will it attempt to overcome 
grossly inappropriate financial incentives, or will it merely modify 
the direction of financial incentives that are alrtady close to 
being appropriate? Will regulators attempt "to make water run uphill," 
or merely attempt to channel the stream in its downhill course? 
The significance of the distinction is this. The managers of 
regulated firms will make judgments about the benefits and costs of 
attempts either to change regulatory rules to their benefit or to 
evade them. If a regulator attempts to make the regulated behave in a 
8 
way that is directly opposed to their fin:mcial interests, regulated 
entities will have a strong incentive to attempt to bend, fight or 
evade regulations. :his will force regulators to deal with many 
individual cases and subject them to continuing pressure to grant 
exceptions to their general policies. If, on the other hand, the 
regulators attempt merely to modify the behavior of the regulated 
at the.margin in such a way that the financial benefit to the 
regulated of changing or evading the rules is small, then one can 
expect fewer, less ferociously battled attempts to change the rules and 
fewer skillful attempts to evade regulation, for the simple reason 
that there will be less potential gain if these strategies succeed. 
In this case, regulators are rarely if ever directly threatening to the 
finantial survival of firms, and can manage these cases by exception. 
This section focuses on the consequences of attempting to use regula­
tion as a substitute for appropriate financial incentives. 
As used here, regulation refers to a type of social control 
of transactions that is characterized by its procedures as well as by 
the substantive purpose of the regulation. The two key characteristics 
of regulation are as follows. First, the regulatory authority is not 
a party to the trans2ctions it regulates. Instead, it acts as the 
referee of transactic�s between other parties. By contrast, eligibility 
requirements and cost reimbursement formulas for Medicare or Medicaid 
recipients are not, in this sense, regulations because they are 
written by the purchaser of the service. These controls are more 
properly regarded as terms of a contract between a purchaser and a 
vendor. While these controls are likely to be subject to the same 
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kinds of political and legal problems that plague regulation, their 
development and promulgation is by an agency with a direct budgetary 
stake in the outcome. Consequently, the agency is directly accountable 
for the financial implications of its decisions, whereas a regulatory 
agency is not. Second, regulation is operated according to procedural 
rules that were developed from case law and formalized after the 
fact in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946. The most important 
features of these rules are that decisions must be based on evidence 
that is presented in formal proceedings, that substantial evidence 
must be submitted in support of each decision, and that the courts 
may review a de cision if it is appealed by a participant in the regu-
latory proceeding. By contrast, conditions on government purchases 
and subsidies do not have such elaborate procedural requirements. 
The formal procedures make the regulatory process expensive 
and time consuming. Moreover, the expense is greater as the number 
of regulated entities grows, making the wisdom of regulatory inter-
vention in part dependent on the structure of the regulated industry. 
An agency can regulate an industry either by dealing 
separately with each firm or each market (the case approach), 
or by writing general rules to simplify cases or to apply directly 
to all firms in the industry without using individual proceedings for 
each firm (the rule-making approach). In an industry with numerous 
firms, both approaches have important weaknesses. 
The case approach to regulating numerous entities produces 
a situation in which many proceedings are underway simultaneously, 
all with different participants, evidence and proposed decisions. 
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Because participation is costly, groups whose welfare is affected by 
many pending cases may not be able to afford to be represented in all 
proceedings. Yet, because policy is developed by precedent, each case 
can have important effects on cases involving completely different 
sets of producers and consumers. Moreover, the case approach 
undermines the development of consistent policy. Each decision 
depend� on evidence presented in that case, and evidence is bound to 
vary from proceeding to proceeding. Evidence and policies developed 
in one forum will diffuse slowly into other proceedings because of 
the informational problems that participants face in attempting to 
track the progress of many simultaneous cases. 
The rule-making approach also presents problems. A ruie­
making proceeding, because it directly affects the welfare of many 
groups, normally will have many participants. Consequently, a rule­
making proceeding usually takes several years before a decision is 
rendered -- not counting the additional years normally lost in inevitable 
appeals through the federal court system. Moreover, general rules, 
based upon average conditions in an industry, will produce specific 
instances of inefficiency and inequity whenever firms and markets 
are h�terogeneous. If the industry displays this heterogeneity, some 
firms will not find regulatory rules binding, while others will be 
threatened with extreme financial pressures, perhaps even bankruptcy, 
if they are forced to comply. While· the former are likely to remain 
unaffected by regulation, the latter are likely to be provided with 
exceptions procedures. The escape valve of an exceptions process 
and the procedural safeguards of administrative law serve the same 
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equity objectives. The former saves the regulator from the 
embarrassment of protecting consumers so well that some are denied 
needed service! But it also blunts the effectiveness of the agency 
by instituting a mechanism which insures firms against failure and, 
in any case, serves to drag out the regulatory process by extending 
it by one more phase. In addition, exceptions are always decided on 
a case-by-case basis, so that the extent to which an agency can rely 
on rule making as its main policy weapon depends on the degree of 
homogenity among the regulated entities and the direct effect of 
the regulations on their financial health. Protracted proceedings 
with numerous pleas for exceptions are more likely to result from the 
regulation of price or product quality in a heterogenous industry than 
from the imposition of informational requirements on the same industry 
or the regulation of prices or product quality in an industry in 
which all firms produce identical products at identical costs. 
The cost and effectiveness of regulation also depend upon 
the complexity of the required information. The more complicated is the 
regulated activity, the more technical and detailed is the evidence 
that is submitted into the regulatory process. Complex information 
requires a more time-consuming process as well as greater costs for 
preparing, interpreting, and evaluating the data. 
The problem is compounded if the objectives of regulation 
are themselves complex and lacking in concreteness. For example, 
"truth-in-packaging" regulations that require honest and complete 
revelation. of the components of a product are easier to develop 
than are minimum standards of product quality. The latter are less 
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susceptible to objectiv� determination �rn<l as a result require more 
careful and complete '-'videntiary pruceedings in orJer to withstand 
judicial appeal. Similarly, while regulation of public utility 
monopolies is always Jifficult because the technology of public 
utilities is sophisticated, the most difficult issue is determining 
the quality of service and the redundancy of capacity that the firm 
will pr,ovide. Once these are determined, the easier tasks are to 
calculate allowable costs and to develop a structure of prices that 
limits the ability of the firm to capture monopoly profits. Or, in 
broadcasting, it is comparatively easy to determine whether a firm 
engages in fraudulent billing practices or broadcasts at the assigned 
frequency and power, but far more difficult to ascertain, as cht! 
Communications Act demands, whether the service provided by a broad-
caster serves the needs and interest of the community. 
Even in the absence of the complexities discussed above, 
regulation has proved co be of limited effectiveness as a mechanism 
for the social control of industry.13 The procedural requirements 
of regulation give relatively well-represented groups with high 
stakes in the outcome a distinct advantage in influencing regulatory 
decisions, and the political obscurity of regulatory agencies tends 
to make them vulnerable to requests for special favors from 
politically active groups. 
As a result, regulation is· normally, on balance, beneficial 
to the regulated industry and harmful to its custor..ers because the 
former tend to be better organized that the latter. The exceptions 
generally occur when the interests of consumers and businesses coincide, 
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when the industry itself is divided, or when the agency is at the 
center of the issues of concern to a mass political movement, such 
as environmentalists or organized labor. For example, product safety 
regulatory a gencies are generally relatively effective in dealing 
with "bad actors" whose products are atypically dangerous compared 
to their competitors, but relatively ineffective -- indeed, often 
pernicious -- when setting standards for an entire industry. The 
successes of indust11-wide safety regulation tend to be regulations 
that are both inexpensive and noncontroversial, but that deal with problems 
that somehow escaped the notice of an industry, usually due to some 
informational problem such as a very low frequency of harmful 
consequences from the industry's products or insufficient incentives 
for any particular firm to engage in the research necessary to solve 
14 the problem. 
When regulation is complicated by sophisticat:ed data 
requirements, heterogeneous firms and vague objectives, regulators 
are especially prone to be protective of regulated entities that are 
on the verge of financial failure. When these complexities are 
present, the cause of a firm's financial difficulties is difficult 
to determine, so that a plausible case probably can be made that the 
regulator contributed to the problem. A political leader who helps 
to determine the fate of the agency through budgetary actions, legis-
lative decisions and informal nonstatutory oversight activities, 
constitutes an informal route for a financially troubled entity to 
appeal agency actions. Politicians can be expected to be concerned 
if a firm in the home constituency appears threatened with extinction 
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by regulatory actions. Thus, an agency may be punishLd by Congress 
or the Executive if it forces a truly inefficient operation into 
bankruptcy whenever the rectitude of its position is less than 
certain, but it faces no conconunitant penalty if it offers protection 
to the failing enterprise. 
For all of these reasons, effective, comprehensive regulation 
is likely to be especially difficult to apply to the medical care 
sector. First, medical care is provided by numerous independent actors 
physicians, hospitals, specialized care centers, other independent 
medical professionals. Second, a unit of medical care service is 
difficult to define and measure. The number of health problems is 
large, and the choice of treatment for each depends on individual 
physiological and psychological characteristics. Moreover, providers 
differ in the kinds and amounts of care they provide and in the treatment 
they,believe to be best for a particular case. Thus, any regulatory 
intervention that promises to have a significant effect on the revenues 
or costs of providers -- and thereby to threaten financial loss to 
some -- will take the form of extensive case-by-case decisions 
(perhaps in the form of exceptions), with all the costs and deflection 
of policy that the case approach necessarily entails. In particular, 
attempts to control pri�es, capacity and the quality of service by 
direct intervention are more likely to exacerbate these problems than 
to ameliorate them. 
In the medical care sector to date, the only economic regu-
lation that has been thoroughly tested is the regulation of hospital 
capacity, and the results bear out the pessimistic conclusions of 
th..; preceding analysis. The fe:deral government has attempted to 
control the number of hospital beds since the 1950s, when federal 
subsidies for hospital construction were made available to 
hospitals only if proposals to expand capacity were approved by 
area planning authorities.15 In the 1970s, community planning has 
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been giving way to certificate-of-need regulation by states in which 
a regulatory authority must issue a permit, based upon an assessment 
of community needs, before an increase in hospital capacity can 
take place. The available evidence indicates that certificate-of-
need regulation has not succeeded in controlling the problem of 
overbedding. For example, a recent study16 found that thirty of 
forty-one states and areas which have such controls and for which complete 
data could be obtained approved hospital beds in excess of 105 percent 
of their published need projection for five years hence. Fourte�n 
of these began the period overbedded and approved additional beds, 
while five others became overbedded during the period studied as a 
result of the projects they approved. Other studies, using multiple 
regression techniques, have reached similar conclusions.17 
The apparent ineffectiveness of certificate-of-need 
regulation is consistent with the preceding general description of 
the problems of regulating an industry as complicated as the health 
care sector. Regulators can be expected to have great difficulty in 
defining the appropriate number of beds for a community. Since 
providers can control occupancy rates, regulators cannot simply rely 
on observing whether beds remain unused. Instead, regulators must 
attempt to assess what bed use would be if all patients were given optimal 
medical care. Since optimal medical care depends on the particular 
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characteristics of a patient, can be defined only by representatives 
of the regulated sector, and, in any event, is subject to wide 
variations in judgment among medical professionals, reaching a 
decision on this issue that varies much from existing standard 
practice is all but impossible. This was illustrated by the experiencE, 
of the Committee on Controlling the Supply of Short-Term General 
Hospital Beds of the Institute of.Medicine, a collegium of health care 
eA'"Perts that, after five years of study, was unable to reach agreement 
on a standard for conmiunity bed needs. Tile committee was able to "et 
an upper bound -- four beds per thousand population -- which they all 
could agree substantially exceeded the desirable standard. Because 
the United States currently has 4.4 short-term beds per thousand
population, the Commitcee could agree that the nation was overbedded, 
but could r.ot agree on a standard that would have any measureable 
effect on hospitalization.
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Considering that Kaiser Permanente of 
Northern California, a large prepaid group practice, operates at 
about 1.5 beds per thousand, the inability of the Committee to find 
a standard below 4 .0 leaves much room for disagreement and uncertainty -­
and improvement in performaace by the industry as a whole.
19 
Even if a target for the overall bed rate could be
established, other issues are bound to be raised when a particular 
hospital applies for permission to expand capacity. Among these are 
the responsibility to expand service for a particular subset of the 
population, the desirability of letting a hospital of particularly 
high quality provide service to a larger proportion of the population, 
the possibility of bringing an exciting new treatment to an area, and 
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the certainty of employing more local residents in building and 
staffing a new facility. Since the relationship of all of these 
issues to the desirability of expanding a hospital is bound to be 
fuzzy, regulators are understandably reluctant to appear to be some 
peculiar form of ogre by preventing the performance of an important 
public service and the creation of jobs. 
The third-party payment system contributes to the problem 
facing regulators. Since most of the cost of operating unnecessary 
facilities is likely to be paid by the federal or state government 
(Medicare and Medicaid) or by insurance policies that are experience 
rated over an area wider than a Health Service Area, the communities 
which regulators seek to protect against rising costs (and hence, for 
political reasons, the regulators themselves) face weakened incentives 
to tip hard decisions in favor of cost control. This could be attacked 
by federalizing regulation of hospital capacity. But the result would 
)e an enormously complex regulatory agency, undertaking to decide 
literally hundreds of certificate-of-need cases simultaneously. The 
agency would be forced to grant permits by formula (thereby overlooking 
legitimate special cases and cormnunity problems, unless the formula 
were overly generous) or to engage in so rr�ny independent decisions 
that coherent policy would be unlikely to develop. 
Even if capacity regulation were to succeed in controlling 
the number of beds, it would still be unlikely to have much of an 
effect on costs. A hospital does not add beds for the single ultimate 
purpose of having beds, but as an instrument in achieving other 
objectives such as attracting more doctors, increasing the status of 
18 
the hospital, or improving its ability to provide what the staff 
perceives to be good care. Because beds are no t the only means for 
achieving these objectives, controlling beds is likely to lead 
primarily to an increase in other activities that also raise costs 
and demand further regulation. This is the familiar regulatory 
tar-baby effect.
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Regulatory agencies, because of the way they are 
designed, must confine their activities to reacting to symptoms rather 
than attacking causes of a problem. If regulation is severely binding 
to a firm, the imagination of entrepreneurial managers generates 
continuing strategic actions that fall between the cracks of regu-
latory rules and defeat the purpose of regulation. The problem is 
most pronounced in a regulated industry with numerous firms, for then 
the regulator faces a substantial problem just in detecting the 
latest innovative response to existing regulations. The detection 
lag, when combined with the time involved in issuing effective 
regulations, produces regulatory activity that primarily affects 
the form and pace of innovation, but does not effectively achieve 
regulatory objectives. 
Regulation to control the adoption of new technologies is 
not likely to be effective because it is even more susceptible to the 
same problems that make capacity regulation ineffective. Host new 
hospital services do not involve the use of expensive new capital 
equipment; instead they are new combinations and more intensive uses 
of services already provided.
21 Thus the opportunity abou.�ds for 
an infinite variety of new technologies that represent changes in the 
way service is delivered, perhaps including new wrinkles that do not 
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constitute a main part of the costs of the entire package of services. 
The first job of the regulator in this milieu will be simp �y 
to detect the existence of new technologies. In principle, regulators 
can demand prior approval of technologies, but in practice, because 
many are rearrangements of existing treatment methods, the definition 
of a new technology will be fuzzy and, as a legal matter, debatable, 
so that the detection of new technologies will be an important 
activity. Because hospitals are so numerous -- even large hospitals 
that are likely candidates for innovation number in the hundreds --
detection will be difficult. 
The problems of the regulator are compounded by the speed 
of diffusion of new technologies among large hospitals.
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C T  scanners 
are a good case in point. The first two C T  scanning units in the 
United States were installed in mid-1973. Three years later 
(August 1976) 652 C T  scanners were known to be in operation, had 
been approved or were on order.
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The rate of installation, 
averaging twenty per month from June 1975 to September 1976, is 
apparently accelerating as new companies enter the market. With 
such rapid diffusion, if more than a couple of years are lost in 
detecting a new technology and sustaining through appeal a regulatory 
finding that a treatment constitues a new technology and therefore 
should be regulated, hundreds of hospitals already will have adopted 
the new technology before regulation of it begins. This places 
regulators in especially difficult straits. Will they impose 
financial losses on innovative hospitals that adopted a new technology 
before the service was legally defined as being one? Or, if use of 
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the new technology is "gran<lfati1ered" but prevented from spreading, 
how will regulators cop� with the incentive this creates for sub­
stantially more rapid rates of adoption of new technologies (in 
order to be grandfathered) and with the competitive advantage that 
grandfathered hospitals will have because they of fer a wider array 
of services? Grandfathering is probably inevitable, but it rewards 
providers who move quickly to buy a new device before proof of 
efficacy and evaluation of cbst effectiveness, and punishes those 
who take a more deliberate approach. 
Most likely, regulators will in fact allow nearly all new 
medical technologies. In part, this is the easy solution to the 
issues raised above. But in part, it is the natural consequence of 
the burden of proof on regulators if a new technology is to be 
denied -- that it be found to have no medical value. The problem of 
new medical technologies is typically one of overutilization, not of 
total ineffectiveness. Because providers and patients face 
weakened incentives to economize on medical care, treatments are 
encouraged to a point at which they have very low or no marginal value. 
Proponents of a new medical technology will provide long lists of 
examples in which it provided great benefit to a patient. The 
important economic issue is not whether the technology should ever 
be used, but how extensively. This is inevitably a tricky issue of 
medical j udgr.K:nt that regulators are unlikely to be willing to second 
guess. And once one hospital in a community is allowed to adopt a 
technology, the incentives will still be present to use it to full 
capacity. This will provide the evidence needed for other hospitals 
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to gain approval to adopt it rather than to refer patients. No 
regulator will deny patients access to a new technology that is 
known to have effective uses because of arguments in principle that 
no community should really have to have more than a single hospital 
with that treatment capacity, and that the hospital having the 
technology should be convinced that it is being overutilized. 
At the heart of the problem of attempting to regulate the 
costs of medical care directly are two difficulties: the tenuous 
nature of the connection between expenditures on medical care and 
health status, and the incentives that regulators inevitably face 
to resolve uncertainties in favor of the regulated entity. The 
latter arise from the nature of the regulatory process and the 
political pressures applied to agencies. When the issue is extra 
expenditures on possibly unnecessary care versus denial of access 
to life-saving treatment, doubts will be resolved in favor of the 
former, regardless of theoretical explanations about perverse incentives 
or after-the-fact cost-effectiveness studies of past regulatory decisions. 
Recent legislative actions to legalize laetrile in several states 
illustrate the essence of the problem facing any politically 
responsible person who would attempt to control the technology of 
medical care. 
The significance of these lessons from regulatory experience 
will be illustrated once again if the recent proposal of the Carter 
Administration to put a cap on hospital revenues is enacted. While 
such a law r.iight retard the rate of increase in spending for a while, 
it is likely to encounter severe problems in the long run. Indeed, 
even its short run effectiveness can be doubted. The Administration 
accurately characterized the program as "transitional." The 
apparently temporary rn:ture of the proposal must further weaken 
whatever incentive hospital administrations might have had to 
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respond to the controls with fundamental, cost-reducing changes in 
management. In fact, for a year or two, ingenious hospital administra­
tors may be able to appear to com;ily merely with bookkeeping changes. 
For the longer run, an exceptions.procedure must accompany the program, 
and when the cap really starts to bind, all the incentives to grant 
exceptions will be at work. In fact, this particular proposal was 
already emasculated at birth by the largest possible exception, the 
wage pass-through that was needed to get labor's approval of the 
measure. Moreover, hospitals will seek to avoid the impact of the 
regulation by "unbundling" services, such as by switching the billing, 
if not the provision, of many services from the hospital to the 
doctor. Regulatory counter-measures will be met by counter-counter 
measures, further distracting the attention of all from the cost­
effective provision of needed and valuable services. Furthermore, 
under an across-the-board rule, such as a 9 percent limit on the annual 
increase in spending, some hospitals will find the rule more generous 
than their needs while others will find that it causes extreme financial 
pressure. The former can be expected to take the full 9 percent, lest 
they lose the right to a future increase based on present costs. 
(Note how this kind of regulation rewards those wJ-.o were especially 
fat and punishes those who were especially frugal in the base year. ) 
The latter can be eh-pected to appeal for exceptions based on their 
particular circumstances. The courts, if not the regulators, will 
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have to consider these appeals in detail on their merits. While 
tying up 1000 hospitals in court might not daunt some would-be regu­
lators, temporary restraining orders may by allowing the hospitals 
to raise their rates while the case is being litigated. Even if 
the proposal were ultimately successful at controlling total hospital 
spending at the stated growth rate, there would be no force in the 
system to motivate efficiency or equity in the allocation or 
production of services. At best, the hospital industry would simply 
add only 9 percent annually to its present wasteful and inequitable 
activities. 
As pointed out above, the essence of the economic problem 
is care of very low or no marginal value. One element of eliminating 
such treatments is, of course, to identify them and to make patients 
and providers aware of the fact. Regulation could be used to serve 
this purpose. Regulators could be given the responsibility to 
evaluate treatments and to define and enforce informational require­
ments on providers and third-party payers. By itself, informational 
regulation is not likely to have much of an effect on medical care 
expenditures since it would not alter the structure of incentives 
facing patients, providers and third-party payers. Nevertheless, 
information requirements are an important component of the reforms 
to be proposed in the next section. 
In general, effective information regulation is easier to 
accomplish than is regulation of prices, costs and technology 
because the former does not have to be burdensome to providers and 
is less directly related to the financial health of regulated firms 
and to the physical well-being of patients -- than is the latter. 
The main problem with i::formational regulation is that government 
officials do not particularly like it. For example, although the 
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act establishing the Consumer Product Safety Commission gives equal 
status to informational requirements and product standards as 
instruments for reducing injuries related to hazardous products, 
during the budgetary process Congr�ssional committees have persistently 
cut back even meager requests for funds to pursue informational 
strategies. Usually these cuts are accompanied by remarks indicating 
the lack of faith Congress has in the ability of consumers to absorb 
and profit from better information on product safety. 24 
Part of the reason for dissatisfaction with informational 
strategies in safety regulation is the observation that some consumers 
continue to buy models and brands that are less safe than competing 
products after better information is provided. An obvious illustration 
is the survival of cigarette smoking despite the publicity on the 
relationship between smoking and health. One reason for this behavior, 
of course, is that people do not single-mindedly pursue the avoidance 
of risks; another is that safety usually is costly, so that consumers 
may j udge that, after a point, added safety is not worth a higher price. 
In the area of health care, the role of informational 
strategies will be quite different, at least initially, than it has 
been in consumer protection policies. As proposed here, informational 
requirements in health would be tied to an expansion of the number 
of options available to consumers for purchasing health care services. 
Institutional arrangerr2nts that provide care at lower costs by 
eliminating unnecessary services would be attractive to consumers 
because of their lower cost if the care provided could be shown to 
be as effective as more costly alternatives. In the beginning, 
informational requirements would serve to assure consumers that 
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options with lower cost could be medically effective. In the longer 
run, informational requirements would provide additional protection, 
beyond existing accreditation and professional review procedures, 
against an erosion in the quality of care because of excessive 
competitive focus on costs. The specific form of informational 
standards in health must remain for medical experts to detail, but 
the general nature of the information would be data on patient outcomes. 
Examples might be case fatality rates from heart attacks, adjusted 
surgical mortality rates, rates and disposition of medical injury 
claims, etc. 
Informational standards can affect medical expenditures 
only in conjunction with other changes in the health care delivery 
system. In particular, consumers must be given a variety of health 
care programs from which to choose, and some of these must be tied 
to new institutional arrangements between providers and payers that 
create incentives for cost control. The burden of the next section 
is to outline the form these other changes could take. 
CHANGING THE STRUCTURE OF THE MEDICAL CARE SYSTEM 
The main alternatives to fee-for-service, cost-reimbursement, 
third-party financing are, first, services provided directly by 
government with spending determined in the budgetary process, and second, 
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services provided by cost-effective organized systems (e.g., i1ealtil. 
maintenance organizatio .. s and other systems that create incentives 
to economize), with total per capita spending determined in a 
competitive market. 
Top-down budgeting may indeed bring total spending under 
control, but by itself, it has no built-in means for assuring that 
much useful output is produced. This is especially true of a medical 
care program whose "output" 
·
cannot be measured in any simple and adequate 
way. For example, at least by civilian standards, the Department 
of Defense operates and fills far too many beds. In Fiscal 1974, 
hospital days of care for active duty military personnel, 95 per-
cent of \{horn are males 18-44, were l, 887 per thousand personnel. The 
Military Health Care Study compared this to 611. 5 days for non ins titu­
tionalized U.S. males age: 15-44, 204.8 days for Kaiser Northern 
California, and 559.4 days for nonactive duty ?eneficiaries of the 
Military Health Services System. Some of this may be explained by 
the particular conditio,i.s of military life; the military and civilian 
utilization data may not refer to exactly the same thing. But much 
of the difference is explained by longer stays for the same diagnosis. 
As the Military Health Care Study tactfully phrased it, "the incentives 
in workload-based programming may encourage relatively heavy use of 
in-patient care." 
A recent National Academy of Sciences study of the Veterans 
Administration system concluded that hospital beds were not located 
in accord with the geographic variation in demand for hospital care. 
The study found that about half the patients in acute medical beds, 
one-third of the patients in surgical beds, and over half the patients 
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in psychiatric beds did not require or receive services for the 
specialized medical facilities that were associated with these types. 
of beds.
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The Veterans Administration experience reflects a pervasive 
problem that government encounters when it tries to provide services 
directly to citizens. In the bureaucratic budgeting process, 
cutting back service to a subsidized group is politically hazardous, 
so that an agency can strengthen its case for more by doing a poor 
job with the budget it has. Moreover, because budgeting is based on 
workload rather than capitation, government physicians face incentives 
with respect to utilization that are similar to the incentives that 
are present in the fee-for-service system.
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In our view, the problem 
of rapid and unproductive increases in spending for health care cannot 
be solved without altering these incentives through a fundamental change 
in the structure of the medical care system. 
In considering proposals to restructure the medical care 
system, one must bear in mind that government seems unable to 
impose involuntary changes in the prevailing arrangements between 
patients and providers. The key features of the existing system, 
in addition to third-party financing, are the fee-for-service payrrent 
method and the use of a personal physician, selected by the patient, 
as a gatekeeper to the other elements of the health care delivery 
system. Any restructuring of the medical care delivery system 
probably must preserve the option for patients and providers to 
continue to operate under these arrangements. In part, this 
resistance to change emanates from providers, since the existing system 
operates to their financial benefit. Rising medical expenditures are, 
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after all, the source of risint; income for providers. Moreover, the 
combination of the fee-for-service, cost-reimburse�ent, third-party 
payment system and the use of the physician as gatekeeper reduces 
the risks faced by providers by eliminating the incentives of 
their clients to constder costs and by guaranteeing within broad 
limits that costs will be covered. 
Patients, also, can be expected to resist mandated changes 
i n  their relationships with providers, especially physicians. Informa­
tion about the quality and effectiveness of health care providers 
and services is difficult for a patient to obtain and is gathered in 
part over years of experience. l·loreover, the success of medical 
treatment rnay depend on the confidence that the patient has in the 
provider. For both re.1sons, patients will value relationships with 
providers that have developed over the years and will be reluctant 
to sacrifice them for the conjectural superiority of alternative 
arrangeffients. This is not to say that patients will not accept 
changes in the medical care system; indeed, if the 2fficiency of the 
medical care sector is to be significantly improved, changes are 
necessary, so that any reform depends upon flexibility on the part 
of consumers. If an alternative set of relationships is developed, 
the superior performance of the alternative can be expected to 
induce patients to switch, since switching physicians occurs 
periodically in any event in response to residential changes, 
unsatisfactory services, changes in age or the retirement of 
providers. The point is that changes are acceptable if voluntary, 
but likely to be resisted if involuntary. Thus, the best hope 
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for restructuring the industry is to facilitate competition between 
the fee-for-service system and alternative plans that are based 
upon capitation payments. 
A competing, capitation-financed plan has two defining 
characteristics: (1) a group of physicians accepts responsibility to 
provide members of a defined population with substantially all 
necessary health services for a fixed per capita payment (based on 
age, sex, and other factors) that is set in advance; and (2) consumers 
exercise free choice from among competing systems of care, but if 
they elect a more costly system, they pay the extra costs themselves. 
Physicians control nearly all health care expenditures. They are 
by far the best qualified to make the difficult judgments about need 
and cost-effectiveness. So it makes sense to give them the main 
responsibility for controlling health care costs, provided that they 
make these decisions in an environment that generates incentives to 
�se resources efficiently. 
In such a system, the physicians as a group would not 
receive more money for providing more or more costly services. 
The competitive market holds them responsible for total spending via 
the capitation; informational requirements and the freedom of consumers 
to switch to an alternative system hold them responsible for giving 
good service. Wide variations in organizational form and physician 
practice style can be compatible with operation within these principles; 
it need not be hospital-based, prepaid group practice. Among the 
competing types of organization, one might find Individual Practice 
Association HMOs, Variable Cost Insurance (VCI) plans, and what 
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Paul Elwood has cal l 2 d  Hca l ch Car2 Al l iances (HCA) . 2 7 An HCA 
would be organized by an i nsurer, and would be associated with 
a limited s e t  of hosp i t als and doctors that have been designated 
by the insurer to deliver comprehensive medical care to the insurer 's 
customers . Like an HHO , the premium for an HCA or a VCI plan would 
reflect the economic efficiency of the providers. Such organizational 
arrangements would not need to e� tail any sudden or drastic change 
in the practice styles of many providers . But, to be economically 
compe titive over the long run, these organizations would have to 
develop cos t controls that are ef fective and acceptable to consumers 
and providers. Health Maintenance Organizations now serve about 
six million people at total cos t s  (premium and out-of-pocket) that 
are ten to forty percent lower than the cos ts o f  s erving comparable 
people with third-party insurance . Most c f  the cos t  savings are 
at tributable to hospi taliza tion rates that are about 30 percent 
lower than the ra tes for similar insured groups . 2
8 
As argued above, physicians and consumers are accustomed 
to the fee-for-s ervice, third-par ty intermediary sys tem and would 
reject an at tempt to change it suddenly and drastically . Nevertheless, 
if HNOs and other new arranger..ents are more e fficient, they will 
gradually win out in cor.-,peti tion with the fee-for-service, third-
party in t ermediary system i f  given an opportunity to compe t e  on 
equ2l term s .  A f a i r  n.arke t t est for HMOs i s  hardly a new idea, 29 
but it still has not been serious ly tried. 
To begin to ameliorate ( s olve being too strong a word) 
the problems o f  open-ended government spending and the inflationary 
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incentives of third-par ty financing, the federal government should 
replace its present commi tment to fee-for-service, cost-reimbursement, 
third-par t y  financing, reflected in Medicare, Medicaid, and tax 
subsidies for health insurance, with a system of fixed prospective 
capitation payments, related to predicted medical need and ability 
to pay, which beneficiaries are free to have paid to the private 
plan o f  their choice . In that way, the government would not b e  
paying more o n  behalf o f  people who choose a more costly system of 
30 car e .  People who prefer a more costly system would be free t o  
elect it, and t o  pay the dif ference o u t  o f  their own n e t ,  a f t er- tax 
income. 
Financial aid to individuals in such a system would b e  
based o n  actuarial categories . A simple, familiar example is 
cat egorization by household size -- individuals, couples, and 
families -- for other than Medicare eligibles . A more complex 
system might be based on age groups, perhaps divided into ten or 
twent y  year age intervals. Actuarial categories would be chosen to 
capture mos t o f  the predictab le variation in medical need . Premiums 
would be determined by individual health benefits plans in a competitive 
m arketplace. The government would b ase its subsidies on actuarial 
cost, or the average cost per person or per family for covered 
benefits. 
For people who are not poor, the Government would 
eliminat e  the open-ended tax exclusion of employer contributions 
and tax deductibility of individual premium contributions . These 
would be r eplaced by a refundable tax credit set equal to some 
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fract ion ( s omewhere between one-third and two- thirds ) of actuarial 
c os t ,  and usable only for p remium p ayments to a qual i f ied health 
p lan ( de fined below) . This would p roduce gains in both e f ficiency 
and equity . It would replace today ' s  marginal tax s ub sidy of 30 p e rcent 
or more to health insurance , with a 100 percent subsidy up to a pre­
determined amo un t  and no s ub s idy beyond that . Tax deduct ions that 
now p rovide the greates t subsidy to the b e s t  covered would be e lim­
inated , and the resulting revenue would be used to p u t  a floor under 
the leas t covered . By raising the a f ter- tax cos t of additional health 
benefits , i t  would motivate people to shop for more cos t-e ffec tive 
health p l ans . 
For the poo r ,  the Government would replace Medicaid with 
"health plan premium vouche r s "  that could be used only to pay 
p remiums to qual i f ied p l ans . The value of the vo uchers given to a 
family would depend upon in come , reaching 100 percent of actuarial cost 
for the very poo r .  The p lan would be means-tes ted , integrated and 
adminis tered through a reformed we l fare system. The amount given 
a poor family would be calculated to be s uf ficient to give them 
enough purchasing power to p ay for a good health bene fits plan . 
Plans would be allowed to comp e te for the business o f  the poor by 
o f fering addit ional bene fits beyond those required of a q ualified
p lan . 
For Nedicare bene ficiaries , the concep t could be implemen ted 
by changing Sec tion 1876 of the Social Security Ac t (which governs 
payments to Health Maintenance Organizations) to permit each 
beneficiary to direct that the adj us ted average per capita cos t for 
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his actuarial category be paid to a qualified health plan in the. form 
o f  a fixed prospective periodic payment . A beneficiary could augment 
this plan by purchasing more comprehensive benefits , but without 
a�d i tional financial assis tance , j ust as today roughly half the 
Medicare beneficiares buy supplemental insuranc e .  Medicaid supplements 
t o  Med icare benefic iar ies would be replaced by means-tested voucher s .  
The obj ect o f  these changes would be to make it possible 
for everyone to bene f i t  from economizing choices by ob taining lower 
premiums , more favorable cost sharing arrangements , or better benefits 
from a more cos t-ef fective system o f  care . That possibility is 
denied to most people today . 
A broad regulatory framework of devices designed to enhance 
comp e t i tion should be coupled with the proposed financing system. 
The purpose o f  the regulatory framework would not be to stop or 
reverse the forces created by the basic financial incentives . Instead , 
the idea is to do as much as possible to create financial incentives 
that motivate socially des irable behavior and to leave to regulation 
only an irreducible , unthreatening minimum. 
The following regulatory proposal s ,  while not a complete 
pro-competitive regulatory f ramework , are advanced to stimulate debate 
and to indicate in general terms the lines that ought to b e  examined 
more thoroughly . The following are suggested requirements for a 
program to be qualified to receive the tax credits , vouchers , and 
Medicare cap itation payment s .  
1 .  Open Enrollment . 
Each qualified plan would be required to participate in a 
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periodic (e .g., annu a l )  open enro ll ment, patte rne d afte r the Fe de ral 
Employ ee s '  Health Be . .  c fits Plan ( FEH BP ) , and to accept all en rolle es 
without r egard to ag e ,  sex, rac e, religi on , inco me , e mploye mnt status, 
or prior h ealt h co r.di t ion. Th is wou ld give ev erybody so met hing fe w have 
today , a c hoic e from amcmg s everal co mpeting plans . Nondiscri minato ry 
enrollment is designe d to insure that plans succ eed by o ffering b ett er 
servic es at lo we r  cos t, not by s �l ecting pre ferred risks. I f  th e 
gov ernment can do a good job o f  s el ecting actua rial cat egories and 
base its capit ation p ayments upon th em , and i f  co mpeting h ealth plans 
bas e  th eir pr emiu ms on the s ame actuarial catego ri es, much o f  the pro fit 
fro m  s electing p re fer red ris ks can be remov ed. But it cannot all be 
r emove d  b ecaus e th ere will al ways b e  other sources o f  var iation in 
individu al h ealth ris ks. At so me point , health plans will have to take 
the ir chances with risk select ion. Oth er w ise, poor risks would be 
uninsurable. An open enroll ment requirement appli ed equally to all 
co mp eting plans woul d h elp to spr ead th e poor risks. 
2. Co mmuni ty Ratin g. 
Co mpeting pl ans should be required to o f fer the sa me rat es 
for the sa me bene fit s to all those in a given actuarial category 
any wher e in a market area. This require ment attacks th e incentiv e 
to seek out pre ferre d risks and co mbats oth er for ms o f  discrimination. 
3. Cata stro ph ic Limit.
The a mount o f  out-o f-poc k et payments that a fa mily must 
make in a y ear would b e  li mited. The ceiling might be r elat ed to 
incom e, and it might b e  high, e.g., $2, 000. But a uni form, clearly 
stated li mit would b e  required o f  all quali fied plans . Th e reason 
for the limit is to assur e that th e purposes o f  h ealth insuranc e 
Nill not be defeat ed and that p eople with serious illn ess es will 
not beco me additional burdens on th e public s ector for lack o f  
adequat e insuran ce. In a capitation-based system, littl e is lost 
in t er ms o f  cons umer inc entiv es fro m  having such a ceiling. Whil e 
consu mer cost-sh aring may b e  on e us e ful tool in motivat_ing economy 
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in the us e o f  r esourc es, it is pri marily use ful and probably 
politically acce ptable wh en appli ed to consum er-initiated primary car e 
and to th e ov erall cost o f  a co mp let e insuranc e packag e, and much 
less effectiv e a nd desirable, i f  at all, wh en a ppli ed to th e costs 
o f  caring for very sick p eopl e .  Th e federal gov ernm ent might r einsur e 
quali fi ed plans for catastrophic costs. 
4. In formation Disclosur e. 
To he lp consum ers judge th e merits o f  alt ernative plans, 
and to h elp assu re public con fidenc e in q uali fied h ealth plans, 
disclosur e o f  ce rtain in fo rmation should be required. Uni form financial 
disclosur e should b e  required, co mparabl e to what the S EC r equir ed o f  
p ublic co mpani es. Data on patterns o f  utilization and availability 
and acc essibilit y o f  s ervices should b e  required, as is no w r equir ed 
o f  HMOs. Each plan should b e  r equired to pu blish th e total per capita 
cost o f  care by actuarial cat egory, including pr emiu ms and out-o f-pock et 
costs. Th e ag en cy that is designat ed to determin e wh eth er a plan is 
quali fi ed would hav e authority to r evi ew and approv e (for accuracy and 
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balance) promotional ma t eria l s ,  including presentations t o  be 
included in the booklet availabl e to all during the period of open 
enrollment, just as the Civil Serv ice Commission now oversees the 
FEHBP. The administrative agency would have authority to review 
and approve the nature and contract description of options for 
additional coverage beyond the basic plan, with the purpose being 
to assure that optio ns either conform to a standard contract or are 
described in a standard contract with a manageable number of clearly 
worded additions and exclusions. This would force plans to publish 
their terms in a format that is understandable to consumers and that 
facilitates direct co 11parison among plans without the consumer having 
to master a lot of f ine print. Finally , the government should gather 
and publ is� informa t i on on the medical qualifications and , as it 
becomes available , the performance of providers . To the extent that 
it is possible , these information requirements should be the same 
for all health benefits plans . 
5 .  Premium Setting by Market Area. 
As menticr .. ed earlier , one factor that weakens the incentive 
of a local regulator to make decisions that will reduce health care 
costs is the knowledge that the premiums o f  many (probably most) o f  
the citizens in the regulator ' s  j urisdiction are based on experience 
over a much wider area. For example , plans like the Aetna and Blue 
Cross - Blue Shield o ptions o f  the Federal Employees Health Benefits 
Program are experien ce-rated nationally . So higher costs in , say, 
Sacramento do not appreciably raise premiums in Sacramento. This 
practice creates a serious barrier to competition. The ability o f  
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Aetna and Blue Cross-Blue Shield to compete against !L�Os for federal 
employees in Washington , D. C. , a high-cost area , is enhanced by the 
favorable experience o f  those carriers in low-cost areas , while HMOs 
have a competitive advantage in low-cost areas . The HMOs , being 
local, must set premiums that are based solely on local costs. 
Competition would be enhanced if each carrier were required to set 
separate premiums that are based on local experience for each 
market area. One or several contiguous Health Service Areas would 
constitute a single uarket area for this purpose. Thi.s dev ice 
illustrates that appropriate regulation can both enhance competition 
and improve the balance of incentiv es bearing on regulators .  
Other regulatory policies that now apply to insurers and 
providers could be incorporated into the new scheme of r egulation. 
Safeguards against fraud and abuse, conf lict-of-interest and all 
forms o f  discrimination could be a part o f  the program. In addition, 
a qualified plan could require that participating providers limit 
charges to approved tee schedules . 
The goal of the preceeding program is to reor ganize the 
deliv ery system into competing organized systems. It c ould be def eated 
if heal th-care financing continued to be provided exclusively by 
third-party intermediaries, each paying f ees and charges to all 
providers. Open panel insurance programs do not f_o_s_t_er com_p�e_t_i_t_i_o_n 
_
_
__
_ 
_ 
among providers to control costs. Rather , they continu e to reward 
providers for cost-incr easing behav ior . For the competitiv e approach 
to succ eed , a large fraction of physicians must be allied with one 
or another competing health plan. The design o f  an appropriate set o f  
rules to assure this must b e  complex becaus e ,  for example, i t  might b e  
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desir able for s ome spcc L1 l i s t s  r: o  wor k d n  re ferr :il for sev 12r c1l pl ans. 
But so me rules to p r ev e n t  a noncomp e t itive ou tco me \Wuld be nee ded. 
A b eginning along thes e line s is to gu ar antee al l c onsu mers ac ce ss 
to sever al pl ans th at di ffer fro m  conv ention al insur ance . Currently 
employers who arr ange and contribute to group insur ance pl ans for their 
employe es are requir ed to o f fer me mb ershi p in one or t wo qu ali fi ed 
ll'10s , i f  av ail able , as well as n or m a l  health insurance . \�hile 
th is is hel pfu l, it do es not go f ar enou g h ,  for a choice b e tween 
t wo or three pl ans do es n ot allo w the forces o f  competition to work 
to ful l effcc t. Ins tead , e mplo yer contributions shou ld be applic able
to me mbership i n  any quali fied pl an o f  an employee 's choosing. Mor e ­
over, employers should be requir ed to prov i de st and arized i r.for mation 
about al l qu alifie d pl <,ns th at s 2ek access to their e mployees . 
The adoption o f  a progr am o f  comp ating he alth c are 
pl ans woul d  free consu mers to choose the pl an that, in their jud gment, 
se rves th em best. Con su mers and providers who pre fer to st ay with 
th e thir d-p arty inter medi ary syste m woul d be free to do so, but 
their decision woul d  not continue to be subsi dized by the gov er nment . 
This propos a l  is not a finished pl an. But neither is a 
propos al to cre ate a regul at ory authority upon which �ill be 
du mpe d  a gener al mandate to control medical care expenditt1res . To 
ou r kno wle dge , no propon ent o f  regul ation o f  he alth c are technology 
has y et describ ed the mech an isms regu l ators are su pposed to use t o  
de al with "gr and fath ering, " providing exceptions , or even de fining 
wh at constit ut es a n ew technology. Anyone who advertises a regul atory 
scheme as t he fi nal word on cost control w i thout addressing these 
issues is viol ati ng the rules o f  truth in advertisin g. 
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